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Abstract 
Eyewitnesses who receive confirming post-identification feedback from a lineup 
administrator have bolstered testimony regarding their identification. This research examined. 
whether people who were evaluating an eyewitness's testimony would notice that feedback 
occurred and realize the effect that it could have on an eyewitness's testimony. Experiment 1 
was a prediction study in which 98 participants either learned that the eyewitness received 
confirming feedback or not. Participants did not differ in their estimations of how the 
eyewitness would answer questions about her retrospective confidence, view, attention, or 
current confidence as a function of feedback. They also thought that the most important 
question in determining an eyewitness's accuracy would be about her attention, followed by 
view, retrospective confidence, and current confidence, respectively. The order in which the 
questions were posed to the participants may be able to account for these findings. 
Experiment 2 was a trial study that utilized a 2(feedback: feedback, no feedback) x 
2(confidence: high, low) x 2(type: retrospective, current) between-subjects design. The 259 
participants in this study thought that the eyewitness was more likely to be accurate in her 
identification and the suspect should be charged with the crime more if the eyewitness 
expressed high confidence than if she expressed low confidence in her identification. The 
other manipulations did not affect the participants' ratings on these questions. Participants in 
Experiment 2 were unable to accurately report on the manipulations regarding the existence 
of feedback and the type of feedback. The null findings in this study may be explained by 
methodological issues, but the problems experienced in this research can be used to inform 
future research on whether or not people will be able to notice that an eyewitness has 
V 
received feedback, realize the distorting powers of feedback on an eyewitness's memory, and 
discount an eyewitness's testimony because of it. 
1 
Introduction 
Mistaken eyewitness identifications are the leading cause of wrongful convictions in 
the United States. Since the inception of the use of DNA as forensic evidence in 1989, over 
170 individuals who were wrongfully imprisoned have been exonerated as a result of DNA 
evidence. Of the first 40 individuals who were convicted of crimes but later proven innocent 
by DNA, 90% were mistakenly identified by at least one eyewitness (Wells et al., 1998). As 
indicated by this statistic, eyewitness testimony can be an extremely powerful form of 
evidence against a suspect. However, when an eyewitness identifies an innocent suspect in a 
lineup, it does not guarantee that the suspect will be found guilty. In order for a mistaken 
identification to result in the conviction of an innocent person, jurors must accept the 
identification evidence as trusted and vote to convict. The purpose of the proposed research 
is to investigate what factors influence peoples' opinions of eyewitness testimony. 
People routinely overestimate the accuracy of eyewitnesses (Brigham &Bothwell, 
1983). This may be due to the fact that eyewitnesses are, at times, unduly confident in their 
identification of a suspect, even if they have "identified" an innocent person (see meta-
analysis of the correlation between eyewitness accuracy and confidence by Sporer, Penrod, 
Read, &Cutler, 1995). One contribution to the weak relationship between eyewitness 
confidence and accuracy is that an eyewitness's testimony about a crime and the subsequent 
identification of the suspect may be bolstered by certain events that occur after the crime or 
the pre-trial lineup (Bradfield, Wells, &Olson, 2002; Luus &Wells, 1994; Semmler, 
Brewer, &Wells, 2004; Wells &Bradfield, 1998, 1999; Wells, Ferguson, &Lindsay, 1981; 
Wells, Olson, & Charman, 2003). Some examples of events that bolster an eyewitness's 
testimony include briefing a witness about the types of questions that might be encountered 
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in an upcoming cross examination (Wells et al., 1981), leading a witness to believe that a co-
witness identified the same suspect from a lineup (Luus &Wells, 1994), or providing an 
eyewitness with feedback about the identification (see meta-analysis by Douglass & Steblay, 
under review). As defense attorneys are becoming increasingly aware of the prevalence of 
these events and the effect that they have on eyewitness testimony, more jurors are being 
informed during trials of the events surrounding an eyewitness's identification of a suspect in 
a lineup. Therefore, the aim of this research was to examine people's perceptions of 
eyewitness testimony after they are told about the process of the witness's identification of 
the suspect from a lineup and the events surrounding the identification. If people know about 
a testimony-bolstering event that occurred during the identification process, and not just 
about the result of this event, are they able to reason about the effects of the testimony-
bolstering event and discount the eyewitness's testimony? 
What do we know about how people make judgments concerning eyewitness 
testimony and what variables are important to jurors when deciding whether or not to accept 
an eyewitness's identification as trusted? One variable that consistently influences jurors' 
opinions of eyewitness testimony is the eyewitness's reported confidence in her identification 
(e.g., Bradfield &Wells, 1999; Brigham &Bothwell, 1983; Cutler, Penrod, &Dexter, 1989; 
Tetterton &Warren, 2005, Wells et al., 1981; Wells, Lindsay &Ferguson, 1979). Simply 
stated, people believe an eyewitness who expresses confidence in an identification more than 
they believe an eyewitness who does not. Belief in an eyewitness's confidence is so great that 
people may distort other portions of an eyewitness's testimony if an eyewitness is highly 
confident. This was shown in a study by Bradfield and Wells (1999) in which people read 
testimony from an eyewitness who was either highly confident or was unsure of her 
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identification. Those people who read testimony from an eyewitness who was highly 
confident remembered the eyewitness as having a better view of the crime and paying more 
attention to the culprit during the crime than did the people who read testimony from an 
eyewitness who was not very confident in her identification. The same experiment showed 
that although confidence is a large determinant of whether participant jurors believe an 
eyewitness's testimony or not, they do not merely accept a confidence statement without 
examining other aspects of the testimony. In fact, participant jurors appeared to weigh each 
of the variables presented during testimony and add their effects together in order to reach a 
decision of the accuracy of the eyewitness's identification. 
Jurors are not the only people who are asked to evaluate eyewitness testimony. Judges 
must first decide whether or not to allow the eyewitness to testify during a trial and some 
must later render their own decision as to the validity of the identification. When j udges 
decide whether or not they will allow an eyewitness to testify in court, they must base their 
decisions on five criteria (Neil v. Biggers, 1972). These criteria are: 1) the opportunity of the 
witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, 2) the witness's degree of attention, 3) 
the accuracy of the witness' prior description of the criminal, 4) the level of certainty 
demonstrated by the witness at the time of the confrontation, and 5) the length of time 
between the crime and the confrontation. Notice that three of these five criteria are based on 
a witness's report of his or her own memory. Although the accuracy of the witness's pre-
lineup description and the amount of time between the event and the attempt to identify can 
be objectively quantified by an outside observer, one must rely on the witness to tell the 
judge about his subjective recollection of how good a view the witness had of the 
perpetrator's face during the crime, how much attention the witness was paying to the 
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perpetrator's face during the crime, and how confident the witness was of the identification at 
the time that the witness selected the suspect from the lineup. Such self-reports have been 
shown to be susceptible to being bolstered by a detective's reaction to an eyewitness's 
identification. 
If a detective provides an eyewitness with confirming feedback after making a 
mistaken identification, this bolsters the witness's subsequent reports of the witnessed event, 
the identification, and conclusions about the identification (Bradfield, Wells, &Olson, 2002; 
Douglass &Steblay, under review; Semmler, Brewer, &Wells, 2004; Wells &Bradfield, 
1998, 1999; Wells, Olson, & Charman, 2003). For example, eyewitnesses who receive 
positive feedback after making an identification report having a better view of the perpetrator 
and paying more attention to the perpetrator's face during the crime than eyewitnesses who 
did not receive feedback. Additionally, when eyewitnesses are asked how certain they were 
at the time that they identified the person in the lineup that the person they identified was the 
perpetrator, eyewitnesses who receive feedback about their identifications give higher ratings 
than those who do not receive feedback. Ameta-analysis of the research regarding the post-
identification feedback effect highlights the consistently robust influence that receiving 
feedback has on the eyewitness. Namely, receiving confirming post-identification feedback 
increases eyewitness reports of how good their view of the perpetrator (Cohen's d = .50), the 
amount of attention they paid to the perpetrator (Cohen's d = .46), how confident they were 
when they identified the suspect from a lineup (Cohen's d = .79), and how confident they are 
of their identification after receiving feedback (Cohen's d = .53) (see meta-analysis by 
Douglass &Steblay, under review). 
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What is interesting about the first three of these effects is that the people who receive 
feedback are distorting their memories of the crime and the identification. In experiments of 
the post-identification feedback effect, before the detective has a chance to react (or not 
react) to a witness's identification, all witnesses in the experiment experience the exact same 
sequence of events. Therefore, all witnesses have the exact same view of the crime, are 
paying the same amount of attention to the perpetrator during the crime on average, and 
would express the same amount of confidence at the time of the identification, on average. 
However, witnesses who receive confirming feedback about their identifications remember 
these events differently than witnesses who did not receive confirming feedback. They 
"remember" having a better view of the culprit, paying more attention to the culprit's face, 
and being more confident when they "identified" the suspect in a lineup. Therefore, the 
feedback is distorting their memory of the crime and the subsequent identification. 
When reasoning about how a witness would report her view, attention, and 
retrospective confidence, will people be able to intuitively recognize and account for the 
possibility of retrospective distortions`? Witnesses themselves do not appear to appreciate the 
effects of confirming feedback. In one study of the post-identification feedback effect, 
participants were able to accurately report on the feedback that they were given 90% of the 
time (Wells &Bradfield, 1998). Of the participants that correctly reported that they received 
feedback, 58%, 78%, and 73% denied that the feedback influenced the way in which they 
answered questions about retrospective confidence, view, and accuracy, respectively. 
However, the participants that did report that they had been influenced by the feedback did 
not differ in their ratings of their confidence, view, and attention from those that said the 
feedback did not influence them. This is not altogether surprising given that social 
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psychological researchers have long noted that people do not have introspective access to 
their cognitive processes and are not always able to accurately report on what influences 
them (Nisbett &Wilson, 1977). However, the aim of the current research was to find out 
whether or not outside observers (namely potential jurors) were able to recognize and 
account for a witness receiving feedback, even though the witness may not be able to do this. 
There is some evidence that people are able recognize when an eyewitness receives 
feedback and discount some of the witness's testimony because of it (Hasel &Wells, 2005). 
Participants read a description of a crime and the investigation of the crime during which the 
eyewitness either received feedback about the identification or did not and the eyewitness 
expressed either high or low current confidence in the identification. People who read 
testimony from an eyewitness who was highly confident in the identification believed the 
eyewitness more than people who read testimony from an eyewitness who was not very 
confident in the identification. However, when they knew that the eyewitness had received 
feedback, participants significantly discounted the highly confident witness's testimony to a 
point where it was believed no more than the testimony from a witness who was not 
confident. Therefore, people do appear to discount an eyewitness's cu~~ent confidence 
statement if they know that she received post-identification feedback. 
This finding is not too surprising, given that in order for someone to recognize the 
effects of feedback on current confidence, the person would not have to possess a very 
profound theory of memory. This person would merely have to notice that the eyewitness 
received confirmatory feedback and understand that if an eyewitness is told that she has 
made "the correct" decision, then the eyewitness might be more confident that she had made 
the right decision. However, in order for someone to recognize the effects of feedback on 
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eyewitness' ~et~ospective reports of their confidence, view and attention, the person must 
possess a relatively complex understanding of human memory. Namely, this person must not 
only be able to notice that the feedback occurred, but also be able to understand that a) 
memory for retrospective judgments of certainty can be distorted and b) receiving positive 
feedback may have produced memory distortions in this particular eyewitness. This research 
attempted to determine whether people possess an understanding of how this complex 
memorial process wor s. 
Ju~o~ Perceptions of Eyewitness Evidence 
There are different ways in which people's knowledge of the factors that influence 
eyewitness testimony have been examined. Three methodologies that have been utilized are 
1) surveying knowledge through questionnaires, 2) assessing ability to predict the outcome of 
eyewitness identification experiments, and 3) examining verdicts and opinions about written 
or videotaped trials (Devenport, Penrod, &Cutler, 1997; Wells, 1984; Wells &Olson, 2003). 
The following is a brief review of some of the advantages and disadvantages of these three 
types of studies. 
Survey studies. Survey studies typically involve having participants read statements 
and give ratings on how much they agree or disagree with them. Surveys tend to show that 
people's judgments about issues that are related to eyewitness identifications do not reflect 
knowledge about the factors that influence identification accuracy (e.g., Deffenbacher & 
Loftus, 1982; Kassin & Barndollar, 1992; McConkey &Roche, 1989; Noon & Hollin, 1987). 
Most recently, Kassin and Barndollar found that people disagreed with experts on 15 of 21 
statements about factors that affect identification accuracy. For example, more experts than 
survey-respondents agreed with the statements that "An eyewitness's confidence is not a 
8 
good predictor of his or her identification accuracy," and that "Eyewitness testimony about 
an event often reflects not only what they actually saw but information they obtained later 
on." This indicates that some of the findings in the field of eyewitness psychology are not 
commonsensica . 
Although survey studies are important and provide researchers with an idea as to 
what people intuitively know about eyewitness evidence, there are inherent problems with 
drawing conclusions from them (Wells, 1984). To begin with, a survey respondent may 
attempt to second-guess the questionnaire administrator and provide answers that either 
confirm or disconfirm the hypothesis. This might skew the data to non-intuitive findings. It is 
also possible that some survey questions may have unintended demand characteristics that 
nudge a participant to respond in a certain way because of the wording of the question. 
Additionally, jurors would not typically receive information about eyewitness evidence in a 
survey. A questionnaire does not simulate areal-world situation in which j urors learn about 
multiple characteristics of the eyewitness testimony and must subjectively weigh the 
importance of each. Lastly, people do not appear to be able to accurately report on what 
influences them or what is going to influence them (Nisbett &Wilson, 1977). Although 
survey respondents may believe that certain aspects of eyewitness testimony would influence 
their evaluation of the identification, it is impossible to draw an inference about what the 
respondents would actually do when confronted with all the evidence at a trial. 
Prediction studies. In prediction studies of juror knowledge, participants are typically 
presented with the methods section of apreviously-conducted eyewitness identification 
experiment and are asked to predict the outcome of the study. These predictions are then 
compared with the outcome of the original study in order to assess whether or not people 
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have an understanding of how different situations affect eyewitness behavior. For example, 
Wells (1984) conducted a prediction experiment based on an experiment by Malpass and 
Devine (1981). In the original study, participants were presented with either biased or 
unbiased lineup instructions and presented with either atarget-present or atarget-absent 
lineup. After that study had been conducted and published, Wells presented the methods 
section of this paper to a different group of participants and asked them to predict what 
percentage of people in the original study would have chosen the culprit, an innocent suspect, 
or made no choice. The results of both the original study and the prediction study are 
reprinted in Table 1 (Wells, 1984). As can be seen, participants did not intuitively know or 
reason about the effect that different instructions would have on people's propensity to 
choose an innocent suspect in a lineup rather than to indicate that the culprit was not there. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that nonexperts do not have an understanding of this particular 
phenomenon. 
Another interesting finding by a prediction study is that when estimating the results of 
three different studies, over 80% of the participants overestimated the hit rates of 
eyewitnesses who were presented with target-present lineups (Brigham &Bothwell, 1983). 
This is a very strong indication of people's tendency to overestimate the accuracy of 
eyewitnesses. 
Although prediction studies can give us insight into the intuitive knowledge that 
jurors have about eyewitness evidence, there are also some limitations to this type of study 
that one must take into account (Wells, 1984). For example, prediction studies lack the aspect 
of group discussion about a phenomenon that is an essential part of the deliberation process 
of juries. Also, participants in a prediction study may be able to reason about the base rate 
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with which a certain phenomenon might occur in eyewitnesses, but such studies cannot 
examine how jurors would reason about a pa~ticula~ eyewitness who provides emotion and a 
back-story along with the conditions under which she viewed and identified the suspect. 
Trial studies. In trial studies, participants are given a description of a crime and an 
investigation, either through a written scenario or through a videotaped mock-trial, and asked 
to make judgments about the information presented. Typically, participants are asked 
whether or not they would find the defendant/suspect guilty and are asked to make other 
judgments regarding the evidence or the defendant. For example, Bradfield and McQuiston 
(2004) presented participants with a trial transcript in which either an eyewitness's 
confidence stayed consistent, was inflated between the time of the identification and trial, or 
was inflated between the time of the identification and trial but was challenged by an 
attorney. Participants were then asked to rate the credibility of the eyewitness. It was found 
that any inflation of the eyewitness's confidence decreased the jurors' belief in the 
eyewitnesses' accuracy a little bit, but it was not until the eyewitness's confidence inflation 
was explicitly challenged by the opposing attorney that belief in the accuracy of the 
eyewitness declined. Therefore, it was concluded from this study that people do not pay 
much attention to an eyewitness's inflated confidence unless it is explicitly pointed out 
during the cross-examination of that witness. 
Whereas trial studies may provide some of the most accurate demonstrations of how 
jurors would respond to eyewitness evidence in the context of a trial, there are still some 
concerns about drawing conclusions from these trial studies (Wells, 1984). One major 
problem with this type of study is that the evidence presented in each of the "trials" is unique 
to that experiment. Therefore, it is very difficult to generalize to other situations in which the 
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evidence is different. Because of this, a trial judge might not allow eyewitness experts to 
report on such findings if the evidence utilized in the study is not sufficiently similar to the 
trial at hand. Additionally, because the trials that are utilized in these studies are typically 
fictitious, an eyewitness researcher may fail to capture some realistic aspect of the behavior 
of eyewitnesses when creating the trial (Wells, 1984). 
As can be seen, each methodology for determining people's perceptions of the factors 
that influence eyewitness testimony has its advantages and its disadvantages. Therefore, the 
most effective way to examine what people intuitively know is to conduct multiple 
experiments, utilizing more than one methodology, and see whether the results from the 
different studies differ or coincide. The proposed research did just that. Two different 
experiments were conducted, one prediction study and one trial study, both of which 
examined people's awareness of the post-identification feedback effect. Both experiments 
utilized the same description of a crime and information about the investigation of that crime. 
The first was a prediction study, whose purpose was to see if participants are able to predict 
the effect that post-identification feedback has on eyewitness reports on retrospective 
confidence, view, attention, and current confidence. Although participants were either 
informed or not informed that the eyewitness received feedback, they did not know how the 
eyewitness answered questions about retrospective confidence, view, attention, or current 
confidence. Instead, the participants were asked to guess how the eyewitness would answer 
these questions. It was hypothesized that when the participant learned that the eyewitness 
received feedback, the participants would believe that her ratings of current confidence will 
be inflated but that her ratings of retrospective confidence, attention, and view will not be 
affected. Recall that people appear to be able to reason about how post-identification 
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feedback might influence a person's current confidence, but an intricate meta-theory of 
memory is necessary for people to discount bolstered testimony about events that occurred 
before the feedback was given. 
The other study was a "trial" study, whose purpose was to see if participants would 
discount an eyewitness's self-reported retrospective confidence as much as they discount an 
eyewitness's current confidence when they learn that she received feedback. Consistent with 
the prediction study, it was hypothesized that participants would not discount eyewitness's 
inflated reports on this retrospective measures in the feedback condition. Although 
participants are able to discount an eyewitness's current confidence (Hasel &Wells, 2005), it 
was expected that participants in these studies would not be able to reason about how 
feedback influences an eyewitness's retrospective memorial report. However, as in the past 
study, we wanted to give participants the best possible opportunity to notice the presence of 
feedback and discount the eyewitness's testimony because this is a difficult task. In order to 
assist the participants, we had them learn about the presence of feedback before they learned 
about the eyewitness's confidence level. This situation is more likely to facilitate the 
discounting of the eyewitness's confidence statement than if people learn about the 
eyewitness's confidence level before they learn about the presence of feedback because of 
the belief perseverance effect (Anderson, 1995; Anderson &Lindsay, 1998; Anderson & 
Kellam, 1992). If participants were to learn about the eyewitness's confidence level before 
learning about the presence of feedback, then they may form beliefs about the eyewitness's 
accuracy. These beliefs may then persevere, regardless of whether the participants later learn 
that the eyewitness received feedback or not, and affect the participants' later ratings of the 
eyewitness's accuracy. Therefore, in the past and current research, participants learned about 
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the presence of feedback before they learned about the eyewitness's confidence level. That 
way, prior knowledge of the eyewitness's confidence would not have affected the amount to 
which participants discounted the eyewitness's testimony if they knew that she received 
feedback. 
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Experiment 1 
This experiment was a prediction study, designed to examine whether people 
intuitively realize the effect that post-identification feedback has on witness reports of 
retrospective confidence, view, attention, and current confidence. The specific scenario 
utilized was fictitious, so there were not past experimental values of how much actual 
eyewitness reports of the aforementioned variables will increase if the witness receives post-
identification feedback, as opposed to not receiving any feedback at all. Therefore, a 
quantitative comparison could not be made from past experiments to this one. However, the 
post-identification feedback effect is so robust that we know some inflation on all four 
variables would occur and we know the approximate effect size of each across studies. Recall 
that ameta-analysis of the post-identification feedback effect has found that participant-
witnesses who receive feedback consistently express higher retrospective confidence, a better 
opportunity to view the perpetrator, paying more attention to the perpetrator, and higher 
current confidence (Cohen's d = .79, .50, .46, and .53, respectively) than participants who 
received no feedback (Douglass & Steblay, under review). 
Method 
Ninety-six undergraduate students at a large Midwestern university participated in 
this study for partial credit in an introductory Psychology class. The full description of a 
crime and the subsequent investigation of that crime that participants were given is shown in 
Appendix A. Participants learned from this description that during the course of the 
investigation, the eyewitness was either given confirming feedback ("Great job, Miss Jones. 
You picked the guy we thought it was. Thank you Miss Jones") or not ("Thank you Miss 
Jones"). In the No Feedback condition participants also learned that the detective told the 
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prosecuting attorney that "Miss Jones did a great j ob. She picked the guy we thought it was," 
in order to control for any influence of the participants knowledge of the detective's belief in 
the guilt of the suspect. Additionally, the evidence described in the scenario did not point 
significantly towards the suspect's guilt or innocence. 
At the end of the description, participants learned that the prosecutor asked the 
eyewitness four questions: "First, at the time that you picked the man from the photo lineup, 
how certain were you that he was the man who robbed the store`? I am not asking you how 
certain you are of your identification now, but rather how certain you were at the time you 
picked the man from the photo lineup on a scale from 1 to 10, with 1 indicating that you were 
not certain at all and 10 indicating that you were extremely certain. Second, on a scale from 1 
to 10, with 1 indicating that you had a horrible view and 10 indicating that you had a perfect 
view can you tell me how good of a view you had of the robber? Third, on a scale from 1 to 
10, with 1 indicating that you were not paying attention and 10 indicating that you were 
paying very close attention, how much attention were you paying to the robber's face while 
the crime was occurring? Lastly, on a scale from 1 to 10, with 1 indicating that you are not 
confident at all and 10 indicating that you are extremely confident, how confident are you 
now that the man you picked from the lineup was the man who robbed the store?" After 
reading the entire description, participants were asked to guess how the eyewitness 
responded to each of these questions on a scale from 1 (not certain at all, horrible view, not 
paying attention, not confident at all) to 10 (extremely certain, perfect view, paying very 
close attention, extremely confident), respectively. A full list of the questions that the 
participants were asked can be found in Appendix B. 
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After predicting how the eyewitness would respond to the previous questions, 
participants were asked to answer a few questions about the scenario from memory, 
including a question about what the detective said to the eyewitness after she made her 
identification. This was done in order to see whether the participants could remember 
whether the eyewitness was given feedback or not. The participants were also asked if there 
was anything about the procedure used by Detective Thompson in conducting the photo 
lineup that caused them some concern. If a participant answered "yes" to this question, he or 
she was asked to explain the cause for concern. This was done to see if the participants in the 
feedback condition would not only notice that feedback had occurred, but also express some 
concern about how it would influence the eyewitness. Finally, the participants were asked to 
rank-order the importance of Prosecutor Linskey's questions of Miss Jones (i.e., retrospective 
confidence, view, attention, and current confidence). This was done in order to examine 
whether the relative weight that participants would assign to the answers of each of these 
questions would vary across feedback conditions. These manipulation check questions can be 
found in Appendix C. 
Results 
Dependent variables. Overall, the presence of feedback did not have a significant 
impact on participants' ratings of how Miss Jones would rate her retrospective confidence, 
t(94) = 1.72, p = .09, d = .3 5, view, t(94) _ .92, p = .3 6, d = .19, attention, t(94) _ . 83, p = 
.41, d = .17, or current confidence, t(94) _ .22, p = .83, d = .04. Means, standard deviations, 
and confidence intervals are shown in Table 2. When the predicted level of confidence across 
time was examined in relation to the existence of feedback, there was a significant main 
effect for the predicted level of confidence between retrospective and current confidence F(1, 
17 
93) = 7.73, p = .007, Cohen's f = .29, with participants believing that Miss Jones would rate 
her retrospective confidence (M = 7.08, SD = 1.68) higher than she would rate her current 
confidence (M = 6.39, SD = 2.32). There was not a significant interaction for the predicted 
confidence levels between feedback and type of confidence statement given, F(l , 93) _ .91, p 
_ . 3 4, Cohen' s f = .10. 
There were no significant differences between feedback conditions for participants' 
ranking of how important they thought the questions about retrospective confidence, t(94) _ 
.72, p = .47, d = .15, view, t(94) _ .10, p = .92, d = .02, attention, t(94) _ -.12, p = .91, d = 
.02, or current confidence, t(94) _ .15, p = .88, d = .03, would be to determining the accuracy 
of Miss Jones' identification. However, there were significant differences in how important 
participants thought each variable that the eyewitness reported on was in determining the 
accuracy of Miss Jones' identification, F(3, 282) = 23.81, p < .001, Cohen's f = .50. Paired 
comparisons showed that the question about attention was rated as more important than the 
question about view, t(95) = 1.92, p = .05, d = .27, the question about view was rated as more 
important than the question about retrospective confidence, t(95) = 3.16, p = .002, d = .55, 
and the question about retrospective confidence was rated as more important than the 
question about current confidence, t(95) = 2.94, p = .004, d = .47. Means, standard 
deviations, and confidence intervals for these ratings are shown in Table 3. 
Were the participants' predictions of the eyewitness' ratings of retrospective 
confidence, view, attention, and current confidence related to one another? The correlation 
matrix in Table 4 suggests that they were because all four predictions are significantly 
correlated with one another. However, when separated by condition, as is done in Table 5, 
the results show a different pattern. The participants' estimates for the eyewitness's ratings of 
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retrospective confidence, view, attention, and current confidence in the condition where the 
eyewitness did not receive feedback showed a pattern very similar to that shown overall, in 
that all of the ratings were significantly related to one another. The participants in the 
condition where the eyewitness did receive feedback, however, did not show this same 
pattern. In fact, every correlation, except for the one between view and attention is 
significantly lower for the participants who learned that the eyewitness received feedback 
than for the participants who did not learn this. Is this, perhaps, due to the fact that the 
participants in the feedback condition were concerned about the fact that the detective gave 
the eyewitness confirming feedback about her identification? 
Concern question. Overall, 47 participants (48.96%) expressed some concern about 
the way in which the lineup was conducted. Significantly more participants in the condition 
where they learned that the eyewitness received feedback expressed concern than in the 
condition where no information about the detective's response was given, X2(1, N = 98) _ 
15.05, p < .001, phi = .3 96. Of those in the feedback condition who expressed concern, 
66.67% indicated the detective's feedback to the eyewitness about her identification of the 
suspect. 
Would those participants who noticed the feedback and had concern about the 
feedback predict that the eyewitness would give different ratings for her retrospective 
confidence, view, attention, and current confidence, than those who did not learn that the 
eyewitness received feedback? When only the predictions of the participants who expressed 
concern about the feedback and the participants in the no feedback condition were analyzed, 
participants predicted that Miss Jones's retrospective confidence would be higher in the no 
feedback condition (M = 7.3 8, SD = 1.74) than in the feedback condition (M = 6. S 0, SD = 
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1.50), t(68) = 2.04, p = .04, d = .54. Participants from this subset of the sample did not differ 
significantly in their predictions of how Miss Jones would rate her view, t(68) = 1. l 8, p = 
.24, d = .31, attention, t(68) _ .79, p = .43, d = .21, or current confidence, t(68) = 1.00, p = 
.32, d = .26. Means, standard deviations, and confidence intervals of these predicted values 
can be found in Table 6. When the predicted level of confidence across time was examined in 
relation to feedback, there was no longer a significant main effect for the predicted level of 
confidence between retrospective and current confidence F(1, 68) _ .453, p = .50, Cohen's f 
_ .08. However, there was across-over interaction pattern between the predicted confidence 
levels between feedback and the type of confidence statement given, F(l , 68) = 6.48, p = .O l , 
Cohen's f = .31. Participants who learned that Miss Jones received feedback believed that her 
current confidence would be higher than her retrospective confidence. But, contrary to what 
was predicted, participants who did not learn that Miss Jones received feedback believed that 
her retrospective confidence would be higher than her current confidence. 
Further analysis of ratings of the participants who expressed concern about the 
feedback and the participants in the no feedback condition showed that there were no 
differences across conditions for participants' ranking of how important they thought the 
questions about retrospective confidence, t(68) = 1.34, p = .19, d = .34, view, t(68) _ .10, p = 
.21, d = .32, attention, t(68) _ .03, p = .98, d = .01, or current confidence, t(68) _ .42, p = .68, 
d = .11, would be to determine the accuracy of Miss Jones' identification. Similar to the 
entire sample, there were significant differences in how important participants thought each 
variable that the eyewitness reported on was in determining the accuracy of Miss Jones' 
identification, F(3, 204) = 11.72, p < .001, Cohen's f = .42. Paired comparisons showed that 
attention was still rated as more important than view, t(69) = 2.43, p = .02, d = .39, view was 
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still rated as more important than retrospective confidence, t(69) = 2.05, p = .05, d = .41, and 
retrospective confidence was still rated as more important than current confidence, t(69) _ 
2.44, p = .02, d = .45. Means, standard deviations, and confidence intervals for these ratings 
are shown in Table 7. 
Discussion 
The presence or absence of feedback did not have a significant impact on the 
participants' estimates of how the eyewitness would rate her retrospective confidence, her 
view of the culprit during the crime, the attention that she was paying to the culprit during the 
crime, or her current confidence. Recall that there were strong reasons to believe that the 
presence of feedback would affect the eyewitness's estimated current confidence because 
Hasel and Wells (2005) showed that people were able to discount the testimony of a witness 
who expressed high current confidence if they knew that she received feedback. This 
discrepancy in results may have resulted from a variety of reasons, the first of which is the 
different methodology that was utilized in the past research and in the current research. The 
Hasel and Wells study was a trial study in which participants were presented with a witness 
who was asked only about her current confidence, and she either expressed high or low 
confidence in her identification. However, the current research was a prediction study in 
which participants were asked to estimate how the eyewitness would rate her retrospective 
confidence, view, attention, and current confidence. It is possible that when the eyewitness 
was only asked one of these questions, the participants were able to reason about the effect of 
feedback on that one question. However, when they were told that the eyewitness was asked 
all four questions, the participants may not have been able to reason about how the 
eyewitness would respond to all four questions. Additionally, when given an eyewitness's 
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confidence statement, people may be able to reason about how feedback may have inflated 
this confidence statement. However, when people are asked to estimate how an eyewitness 
would respond to a question about her confidence, people may not be able to reason about 
the eyewitness experiencing an increased feeling of confidence merely due to feedback. This 
might be because people may not realize that confidence is malleable unless they see 
evidence of confidence inflation. 
Another reason why the participants' estimates of the eyewitness's rating of her 
current confidence may not have been significantly different across feedback conditions is 
the order in which the eyewitness was asked the four questions. Participants always learned 
that the eyewitness was asked about her retrospective confidence, followed by a question 
about her view, followed by a question about her attention, which was followed by a question 
about her current confidence. In hindsight, this order may have triggered a variety of meta-
theories about what the prosecutor and/or the experimenters were trying to achieve. For 
example, participants may have thought that the questions about view and attention were 
posed to the eyewitness in order for her to realize that she did not have a good view of the 
culprit and was not paying attention to the culprit's face while the crime was occurring. This 
may have led to the participants' estimations of the eyewitness's current confidence (the last 
question asked) being lower than the estimations of the eyewitness's retrospective confidence 
(the first question asked). Participants may also have thought that when the eyewitness was 
asked: "How confident are you now that the man you picked from the lineup was the man 
who robbed the store," the prosecutor was referring to how confident the eyewitness was 
after thinking about her view and attention during the crime, instead of how confident the 
eyewitness was, in general, the day after the identification. The possibility of this type of 
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meta-cognition is supported by the participants' ranking the questions about the eyewitness's 
view and attention as more important than questions about the eyewitness's retrospective and 
current confidence in determining the eyewitness's accuracy. The difference between 
retrospective and current confidence may have been better examined in a between-subjects 
design in which participants were either asked to estimate the eyewitness's retrospective o~ 
current confidence. 
The different meta-cognitions that participants had across feedback conditions were 
also evidenced by the differing correlations between participants' ratings of retrospective 
confidence, view, attention, and current confidence. In the condition in which participants 
learned that the eyewitness received feedback, the correlation between retrospective and 
current confidence disappeared, as did the correlation between retrospective confidence and 
attention and the correlation between current confidence and view. It is possible that when 
the participants were not given any information about feedback, they referred to the 
description of the crime and the identification to determine how the eyewitness would rate 
her retrospective confidence, view, attention, and current confidence. However, when the 
participants were given information about feedback, it appears as though they were able to 
reason that there would be differences between the participants' ratings of retrospective and 
current confidence but were not quite sure which rating would be affected. This can be seen 
because of the lack of a correlation between participants' estimates of the eyewitness's 
retrospective and current confidence, accompanied by mean confidence ratings that do not 
differ significantly. 
It does appear that people who noticed that the detective gave the eyewitness 
feedback and expressed some concern about it were somewhat able to reason about the effect 
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that feedback would have on the eyewitness's testimony. The eyewitness's retrospective 
confidence was estimated to be lower by the participants who were concerned about the 
existence of feedback than by the participants who did not learn that feedback occurred. 
Interestingly, the participants who expressed concern about feedback did not believe that 
there would be any differences between the eyewitness's ratings of her retrospective and 
current confidence. The participants who did not learn that the eyewitness received feedback, 
however, estimated that the eyewitness would report having higher retrospective confidence 
than current confidence. It is possible that, overall, the participants either believed that an 
eyewitness's confidence decreases over time or that they thought that an eyewitness's 
confidence would decrease after answering questions about her view of the culprit and the 
attention that she was paying to the culprit's face during the crime. However, the participants 
who expressed concern about the presence of feedback did not follow this same logic. 
Experiment 2 examined the different ways in which people reason about retrospective and 
current confidence by manipulating this factor between participants instead of presenting 
information about both types of confidence to everyone. 
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Experiment 2 
Although prediction studies show what people believe about the variables that 
influence eyewitness reports, other experiments are needed in order to determine what people 
will do when presented with an actual eyewitness's report of either high or low retrospective 
confidence as opposed to high or low current confidence. Recall that although eyewitness 
reports of both retrospective and current confidence are typically inflated after a witness 
receives feedback (Douglass & Steblay, under review), only retrospective confidence is one 
of the Biggers criteria that factor in to judges' decisions of whether or not to allow an 
eyewitness to testify during a trial. Additionally, it has been shown that potential jurors will 
discount the accuracy of an eyewitness's identification if they know that the eyewitness 
received feedback and expressed high current confidence in her identification (Hasel & 
Wells, 2005). However, it is not clear whether people will treat an eyewitness's retrospective 
confidence statement the same way as they will an eyewitness's current confident statement. 
Experiment 2 attempted to answer this question. 
Similar to past research, participants in Experiment 2 either learned or did not learn 
that the eyewitness received feedback and learned that the eyewitness either reported high or 
low confidence in her identification. However, in the current study, participants were 
presented with an eyewitness who was either asked to report her retrospective confidence 
level or her current confidence level. To test our hypotheses, a 2(feedback: feedback, no 
feedback) x 2(confidence: high, low) x 2(type: retrospective, current) between-subjects 
design was created. This design was utilized in order to examine if people were able to 
discount an eyewitness's high retrospective confidence statement just as much as they 
discount an eyewitness's high current confidence statement when they learn that she received 
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confirming post-identification feedback. Therefore, the over-arching question remains: "Do 
people realize that post-identification feedback affects an eyewitness's memory for different 
aspects of events that occurred before the feedback was ever given and discount an 
eyewitness's testimony because of this realization?" However, this research looked at 
whether people judge an eyewitness's retrospective confidence report differently than an 
eyewitness's current confidence report. 
Methods 
Participants were given the same description of the crime and the subsequent 
investigation of that crime that was utilized in Experiment 1, including the manipulation of 
learning whether the eyewitness received feedback or not. However, instead of the 
prosecuting attorney asking the eyewitness all four of the questions, she only asked the 
eyewitness about her retrospective confidence (i.e., "At the time that you picked the man from 
the photo lineup, how certain were you that he was the man who robbed the store") or her 
current confidence (i.e., How certain aye you that the man you that the man you picked from 
the photo lineup was the man who robbed the store?). In this scenario, which can be found in 
Appendix D, the eyewitness responded by either saying that she was highly confident or not 
very confident in her identification. 
After reading the scenario, participants were asked to judge how likely they thought it 
was that the eyewitness made an accurate identification and whether or not they thought the 
suspect should be charged with the crime. The questions that were given to the participants 
can be found in Appendix E. After those questions were answered and the experimental 
materials were taken away, the participants were asked a series of questions about the 
experiment to see whether or not they noticed the presence (or absence) of feedback and 
26 
whether or not they could accurately report on how the prosecutor worded her question to the 
eyewitness about the eyewitness's retrospective confidence. All manipulation check 
questions can be found in Appendix F. These questions were asked in order to see whether 
the participants noticed the feedback and confidence manipulations because if the 
participants did not notice these intricacies of the investigation, then the manipulations may 
not have influenced them. Lastly, participants were asked if there was anything about the 
photo lineup procedure that caused them some concern. If they answered "yes" to this 
question, they were asked to write a statement regarding what bothered them. This was done 
in order to see whether participants in the feedback condition would express concern about 
the feedback and how that might influence the witness. 
Results 
Dependent variables. Participants thought that the eyewitness's identification of the 
suspect was more likely to be accurate F(1, 3 51) = 8.72, p = .003, Cohen's f = .16, and 
believed more strongly that the suspect should be charged with the crime, F(1, 3 S 1) = 17.49, 
p < .001, Cohen's f = .22, if the eyewitness expressed high confidence than if she expressed 
low confidence in the identification. However, there were no significant differences between 
the participants' ratings of the eyewitness's likely accuracy when the eyewitness received 
feedback or not, F(1, 3 S 1) = 1.04, p = .31, Cohen' s f = .05, or if she was asked about her 
current or retrospective confidence F(1, 351) _ .532, p = .47, Cohen's f = .04. There were 
also no significant differences in how much the participants believed that the suspect should 
be charged with the crime across feedback conditions, Cohen's f = .05, F(1, 3 51) = 1.53, p = 
.22, Cohen's f = .06, or across the type of confidence (i.e., retrospective or current) reported, 
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F(1, 3 51) _ .48, p = .49, Cohen's f = .03 . Means, standard deviations, and confidence 
intervals for these ratings are shown in Tables 8 and 9. 
There were not significant interactions between conditions where the participants 
either learned or did not learn that the eyewitness received feedback and the eyewitness's 
reported confidence level on the participants' ratings of how likely it was that the eyewitness 
was accurate, F(1, 3 51) _ .03, p = .86, Cohen's f < .03, or of whether the suspect should be 
charged with the crime, F(l , 3 S 1) _ .07, p = .79, Cohen' s f < .03 . There were also not 
significant interactions between conditions where the participants either learned or did not 
learn that the eyewitness received feedback and whether the eyewitness was asked about her 
current or retrospective confidence in the participants' ratings of how likely it was that the 
eyewitness was accurate, F(l , 3 51) _ .3 6, p = .5 5, Cohen's f = .03, or of whether the suspect 
should be charged with the crime, F(l , 3 S 1) _ .06, p = .82, Cohen's f < .03 . Lastly, there 
were not significant interactions between conditions where the eyewitness expressed either 
high or low confidence in her identification and where the eyewitness was asked about her 
current or retrospective confidence on the participants' ratings of the eyewitness's likely 
accuracy, F(1, 3 51) _ .13, p = .72, Cohen's f < .03, or in whether they thought the suspect 
should be charged with the crime, F(1, 3 51) _ .10, p = .76, Cohen's f < .03 . 
The three-way interaction between feedback, confidence level, and confidence type 
on participants' ratings of how likely it was that the eyewitness was accurate was also not 
significant, F(l , 3 51) _ .01, p = .94, Cohen' s f < .03 . Additionally, this three-way interaction 
was not significant for participants' ratings of whether the suspect should be charged with the 
crime, F(l , 3 51) _ .22, p = .64, Cohen's f = .03 
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Manipulation checks. Overall, significantly fewer people in the feedback condition 
(29.6%) than in the no-feedback condition (5 8.9%) got all three critical manipulation check 
questions correct, X2(1, N = 3 5 9) = 31.18, p < .001, phi = .3 0. However, there were not 
significant differences the number of people who got all three critical manipulation checks 
correct between type of confidence reported, X2(1, N =3 5 9) = 3.27, p = .07, phi = .10, and 
level of confidence reported, X2(1, N = 3 5 9) = 2.04, p = .09, phi = .08. Significantly fewer 
people in the feedback condition (42.5%) than in the no-feedback condition (75.6%) got the 
two manipulation check questions about the presence of feedback correct, X2(1, N =3 S 9) _ 
40.66, p < .001, phi = .34. Additionally, significantly fewer people in the condition in which 
the eyewitness was asked about her retrospective confidence (68.0%) than in the condition in 
which the eyewitness was asked about her current confidence (77.7%) got the manipulation 
check question about what type of confidence the eyewitness was asked about correct, X2(1, 
N =3 5 9) = 4.3 0, p = . 04, phi = .11. 
Concern question. Overall, more people expressed concern about the interaction 
between the detective and the eyewitness if they learned that the eyewitness received 
feedback (53.1 %) than if they did not learn that the eyewitness received feedback (23.9%), 
X2(1, N =3 5 9) = 3 2.3 0, p < .001, phi = . 3 0. Of tho se participants who learned that the 
eyewitness received feedback and expressed concern about the interaction between the 
detective and the eyewitness, 76.8% mentioned having a concern about the presence of 
feedback. Additionally, more people expressed concern about the interaction between the 
detective and the eyewitness if the eyewitness was asked about her current confidence 
(43.5 %) than if the eyewitness was asked about her retrospective confidence (3 3.1 %), X2(1, 
N =359) = 4.05, p = .04, phi = .11. However, of those participants who learned that the 
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eyewitness was asked about her current confidence, only 7.5 %mentioned that the detective 
should have asked for an initial confidence statement. There were no differences in the 
number of people who expressed concern across conditions where the eyewitness expressed 
either low (3 9.1 %) or high (3 7.8%) confidence, X2(1, N =3 S 9) _ .07, p = . 8 0, phi = .01. 
Would those participants who noticed that feedback occurred and had concern about 
the feedback also be more sensitive to whether the eyewitness was asked about her current or 
retrospective confidence or whether the eyewitness reported high or low confidence in her 
identification`? Apparently not. When only the responses of the participants who expressed 
concern about feedback were examined, there were not significant differences between how 
likely the participants thought it was that the eyewitness's identification was accurate across 
the type of confidence that the eyewitness reported, F(1, 75) _ .59, p = .45, Cohen's f = .09, 
or across the level of confidence that the eyewitness expressed, F(l , 75) = 2.99, p = .09, 
Cohen's f = .20. Means, standard deviations, and confidence intervals are shown in Table 10. 
There was also not a significant interaction for the participants' ratings of how likely they 
thought it was that the eyewitness's identification was accurate between the type and level of 
confidence reported, F(1, 75) _ .41, p = .71, Cohen's f = .OS . Similarly, there was not a 
significant main effect for the type of confidence that the witness reported, F(1, 75) _ .60, p 
_ .44, Cohen's f = .09 when the participants had to rate whether the suspect should be 
charged with the crime. Means, standard deviations, and confidence intervals are shown in 
Table 11. However, the participants believed that the suspect should be charged with the 
crime more if the eyewitness expressed high confidence in her identification than if she 
expressed low confidence in her identification, F(1, 75) = 11.84, p = .001, Cohen's f = .40. 
There was not a significant interaction between the type and the level of the confidence 
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reported for the participants' ratings of whether the suspect should be charged with the crime, 
F(1, 75) _ .34, p = .56, Cohen's f = .07. 
Discussion 
Participants thought that the eyewitness who expressed high confidence in her 
identification was more likely to be accurate than the eyewitness who expressed low 
confidence in her identification. Similarly, participants thought that the suspect who was 
identified by the highly confident witness should be charged with the crime more than the 
suspect who was identified by the eyewitness who expressed low confidence in her 
identification should be. However, participants who were informed that the highly confident 
eyewitness received feedback did not discount the eyewitness's testimony, as has been 
shown in past research (Hasel &Wells, 2005). This discrepancy in results is possibly due to 
the fact that participants in the past study were told that the eyewitness received feedback 
from the detective in-person, immediately after the eyewitness identified the suspect. 
However, in the current study the participants were informed that the eyewitness received 
feedback during a phone call made by the detective to the eyewitness later in the day after the 
identification. This was done so that participants in the ~et~ospective confidence condition 
would understand that the prosecutor was asking for the eyewitness's confidence before the 
feedback ever occurred. However, this change may have required participants to possess a 
deeper understanding of feedback than was asked of participants in the past study to discount 
the eyewitness's testimony if she received feedback. 
It appears as though participants in the current study might have reasoned that 
feedback that was not given directly following the identification does not have any effect on 
the eyewitness's testimony. In fact, feedback has the same testimony bolstering effects when 
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it is given up to 48 hours after the identification has taken place as when it is given 
immediately following the identification (Wells et al., 2003). However, participants in this 
study may not have realized that feedback affects an eyewitness's confidence statement, 
whether it is given immediately following the identification or in a phone call the evening of 
the identification. Although people's understanding of feedback's influence on an 
eyewitness's testimony, regardless of when it was given, was not the knowledge that we were 
attempting to investigate in this research, it is an interesting question that deserves further 
investigation. Future research might examine, in a controlled setting, whether people 
discount the testimony of an eyewitness who expresses high confidence in her identification 
after receiving feedback 48 hours after the identification occurs as much as people discount 
the testimony of an eyewitness who receives feedback immediately after the identi lcation 
occurs. It is possible that people in general do realize the confidence inflating effect of an 
eyewitness's testimony after feedback has occurred but that they do not realize that the time 
at which the feedback is given does not matter. 
Another problem with the current study is that some of the critical portions of the 
scenario utilized may not have been fully understood by the participants. Note, for instance, 
that only 44.3 % of the participants were able to correctly answer the two questions about the 
presence of feedback and the question about the type of confidence asked for during the 
investigation. It is possible that participants were able to remember that there was a statement 
about the eyewitness doing a good j ob because she picked the person the police suspected of 
the crime but that they were unable to remember whether the detective told this to the 
prosecutor or the eyewitness. This would have led to the low rate (59.1 %) of participants 
who were able to accurately identify what was said to the prosecutor and to the eyewitness by 
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the detective. Past research (Hasel &Wells, 2005) has likely not had this same problem 
probably because the presence of feedback may have been more salient to participants who 
heard that the feedback occurred immediately after the identification than to participants who 
heard that feedback occurred later in the day. Another critical portion of the scenario that 
may have not been fully understood by the participants was the type of confidence that the 
eyewitness was asked to report. It is possible that participants noticed that the eyewitness was 
asked about her confidence in the crime without noticing whether she was asked about her 
retrospective or current confidence. This could have lead to the low rate (73.0%) of 
participants who were able to accurately identify the question that the eyewitness was asked 
about her confidence. 
Because so few participants were able to accurately report on the critical portions of 
the scenario, it may have led to the null effects found in the current study. Future research 
might emphasize the fact that feedback has occurred by making it directly follow the 
eyewitness's identification or by having the prosecutor ask the eyewitness what the detective 
said to her about her identification. Additionally, future research might emphasize whether 
the eyewitness is being asked about her current or retrospective confidence by being a little 
more specific about the timing about which the eyewitness is asked to report. If these 
changes are made to the scenario so that the manipulations are more salient to the 
participants, then we may find patterns in the data more similar to the predicted patterns. 
However, if these changes are made to the scenario and there are still no differences in the 
ratings of the dependent variables across conditions, then there will be more definitive 
evidence that people are unable to take the presence of feedback into account when analyzing 
an eyewitness's testimony. 
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Although there appear to be the above-mentioned methodological problems with the 
current research, the participants that expressed concern about the presence of feedback show 
an interesting pattern in their responses to the question of whether the suspect should be 
charged with the crime. Namely, the participants who expressed concern about feedback 
believed that the suspect in the case where the witness is highly confident should be charged 
with the crime more than the suspect in the case where the witness is not confident. 
Additionally, there was a significant simple main effect for the participants who heard that 
the eyewitness expressed low confidence in her identification. Namely, participants thought 
that the suspect in the case where the eyewitness expressed low retrospective confidence 
should be charged more than the suspect in the case where the eyewitness expressed low 
current confidence. Therefore, people who are evaluating the testimony of an eyewitness who 
expresses low confidence in her identification might believe the eyewitness's retrospective 
confidence statement over the eyewitness's current confidence statement. This would suggest 
that people do not realize that feedback influences both retrospective and current confident 
statements of an eyewitness. Even though there is only an average of 20 participants per cell, 
the effect is significant and the effect size is almost a medium effect (d = .39). Future 
research that makes the feedback and the type of confidence asked about more salient might 
examine this measure further. 
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Conclusion 
Despite the absence of evidence in this research that participants understand and 
appreciate the bolstering effect that post-identification feedback has on eyewitness testimony, 
it would not be appropriate to conclude that at this point. In hindsight, there were some 
methodological issues in this research that may have led us to not find this effect. In 
experiment 1, the order in which the questions were asked of the eyewitness (i.e., 
retrospective confidence, view, attention, current confidence) may have influenced the way 
in which the participants predicted that the eyewitness would answer them and the 
importance that they placed on each of the questions. This probably resulted in the finding 
that participants thought that questions about the eyewitness's view and attention were more 
important in determining the likely accuracy of the eyewitness than the questions about the 
eyewitness's confidence. Furthermore, this inflated importance placed on the view and 
attention questions may have resulted from the two confidence questions flanking the 
questions about view and attention. This may have led the participants to think that the 
questions about view and attention were posed to the eyewitness so that she would change 
her confidence statement. 
In experiment 2, the feedback was not given to the eyewitness immediately following 
the identification, but rather in a phone call the evening of the identification. We did not 
think that people would not realize that feedback given to an eyewitness after a delay is just 
as powerful as feedback given to an eyewitness immediately following an identification. This 
may have led to our not replicating the findings of Hasel and Wells (2005). Additionally, the 
manipulated presence or absence of feedback and the manipulated question about the 
eyewitness's current or retrospective confidence were apparently confusing to the 
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participants because they were not able to accurately report on their existence in the study. 
This was evidenced by the low percentage of participants who were able to accurately report 
on the existence of these manipulations. If participants were completely unaware of critical 
elements in the scenario that was presented to them, then the presence of these elements 
would have had limited effect on the participants' evaluations of the scenario. Therefore, the 
confusing nature of the scenario may have led to the null effects in experiment 2. 
The methodological problems in both studies were not easily discerned before the 
data were collected because the scenarios presented in the current research were nearly 
identical to the scenarios presented in past research (Hasel &Wells, 2005). Future research 
that fixes these methodological issues may find the hypothesized results. Namely, in a 
prediction study, it may be found that when people learn that an eyewitness received 
feedback, they will believe that her ratings of current confidence will be inflated but that her 
ratings of retrospective confidence, attention, and view will not be affected. Additionally, in 
a trial study, it may be found that participants who know that an eyewitness received 
feedback will discount an eyewitness's high current confidence statement but not an 
eyewitness's high retrospective confidence statement. Fortunately, future attempts to test the 
question of whether people understand the testimony bolstering effects ofpost-identification 
feedback can now take advantage of the methodological issues highlighted by this research. 
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Appendix A 
Crime and Investigation Description for Experiment 1 
Thursday night at about 7:45pm, a man dressed in a black, hooded sweatshirt and 
jeans walked into the 7-11. After walking around for a few minutes and picking up a few 
items, he approached the cashier, a 17-year-old girl named Sarah Jones, and pulled a gun and 
a plastic bag out of the front pocket of his sweatshirt. He told her to open up the register and 
put all the money into his bag. As she opened the register, she noticed that he was not 
wearing any gloves and that one of his hands was on the counter. Approximately $280 was 
placed into the bag. Miss Jones hit the alarm button below the counter while emptying the 
register, but by the time the police showed up, the man had already fled in a small, dark 
green car. 
Miss Jones was taken into the police headquarters and met with Detective Thompson, 
who asked her to give a complete description of the man who had robbed the store. Sarah 
described the culprit as a white man in his late twenties, about 6 feet tall and about 1501bs 
with short dark brown hair. She described his clothing and said that the car was a nondescript 
dark green sedan, and she thought that the license plate started with the number 9. She was 
too in shock after the incident to notice anything else about it. 
Detective Thompson told the police officers in his precinct to stop any cars that fit the 
description, had the number 9 anywhere in the license plate sequence, and were being driven 
by a male between the ages of 20 and 3 5 . The police stopped a few vehicles that evening, and 
two of the vehicles were being driven by males who fit the description of the culprit. 
Although neither man had a license plate that started with the number 9, both had license 
plates that had the number 9 somewhere in the sequence. Also, although neither of the 
drivers was wearing a black, hooded sweatshirt and neither had a bag of money with him, the 
police reasoned that the culprit could have changed and stashed the money somewhere. Both 
men, Sam Cooper and Robert Casey, were called in for questioning. 
Robert Casey told the police that he had been out to eat with his girlfriend at the time 
of the crime. He was able to show the police his credit card receipt from ten minutes after the 
crime occurred. The waitress at the restaurant and his girlfriend confirmed that he was at the 
restaurant at the time of the crime, so he was released. 
Sam Cooper, on the other hand, said that he was shopping for a birthday present for 
his mother at the local mall at the time of the crime but had not bought anything. He did not 
have a receipt to prove his whereabouts and could not name anybody to back up his alibi. 
Additionally, while investigating his record, the police found that he had been arrested about 
a year ago for driving under the influence. Since there was no other evidence linking Mr. 
Cooper to the crime, they asked if they could take a picture of him to place in a photo lineup. 
Mr. Cooper agreed and was released after the photo was taken. 
The next day, Detective Thompson asked Miss Jones to come to the headquarters to 
look at a photo lineup. When she arrived he placed six pictures on the table in front of her. 
All of the pictures were of men who fit the general description that Miss Jones had given: 
male, late twenties, about 1501bs with short dark brown hair. The pictures were numbered 
one through six. Sam Cooper was number four. The rest of the pictures were of other men 
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who were either incarcerated or were police officers in civilian clothing, so none of the other 
men were suspects in the crime. 
Detective Thompson asked Miss Jones to look carefully at the pictures and see if she 
recognized the culprit. He told her that the culprit may or may not be present among the 
photos and that she should take her time in studying each face. Miss Jones studied the 
pictures very carefully before indicating number 4, Sam Cooper, as the man who committed 
the crime. Detective Thompson reacted to her statement and said, "Great j ob, Miss Jones. 
You picked the guy we thought it was. Thank you Miss Jones." (Detective Thompson gave 
no reaction and said, "Thank you, Miss Jones.")1 He then walked her to the door and told her 
that they' d be contacting her again soon. 
When Detective Thompson returned to his desk, he placed a call to Lori Linskey, the 
prosecuting attorney, and told her of Miss Jones' identification of Sam Cooper. (and told her, 
"Miss Jones did a great j ob. She picked the guy we thought it was.") Prosecutor Linskey 
visited Miss Jones during her shift at the 7-11 the next day to ask her a few questions. First, 
she asked Miss Jones to tell her side of the story again. When Miss Jones had told her the 
story up through the lineup, Prosecutor Linskey said, "It is very important that we know a 
few things: First, at the time that you picked the man from the photo lineup, how certain were 
you that he was the man who robbed the store? I am not asking you how certain you aye of 
your identification now, but rather how certain you were at the time you picked the man from 
the photo lineup on a scale from 1 to 10, with 1 indicating that you were not certain at all and 
10 indicating that you were extremely certain. Second, on a scale from 1 to 10, with 1 
indicating that you had a horrible view and 10 indicating that you had a perfect view can you 
tell me how good of a view you had of the robber? Third, on a scale from 1 to 10, with 1 
indicating that you were not paying attention and 10 indicating that you were paying very 
close attention, how much attention were you paying to the robber's face while the crime was 
occurring? Lastly, on a scale from 1 to 10, with 1 indicating that you are not confident at all 
and 10 indicating that you are extremely confident, how confident are you now that the man 
you picked from the lineup was the man who robbed the store?" Prosecutor Linskey wrote 
down Miss Jones' responses in her notebook, thanked her and returned to her office. 
Upon returning to her office, Prosecutor Linskey called Detective Thompson to find 
out if the police had uncovered any more evidence or followed up on Mr. Cooper's alibi. He 
told her that further investigation of Mr. Cooper's alibi revealed that a clerk at the local mall 
said he recognized Mr. Cooper's photo as a person who had been in the mall that evening. He 
could not, however, confirm the time of the evening that he thought he saw Mr. Cooper. 
Additionally, Miss Jones had stated that the robber touched the counter surface. No 
fingerprints lifted from the counter matched Mr. Cooper's prints, but there were several 
smudged prints that could not be identified. 
1 Items in parentheses will be included in the "No Feedback" conditions. 
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Appendix B 
Dependent Measures for Experiment 1 
For the following questions, circle a number that best how you believe Miss Jones would 
have answered each question: 
At the time that you picked the main from the photo lineup, how certain were you that he was 
the man who robbed the store? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not certain at all Extremely certain 
How good of a view did you get of the robber`? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Horrible view Perfect view 
How much attention were you paying to the robber's face while the crime was occurring`? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not paying Paying very close 
attention attention 
How confident are you now that the man you picked from the lineup was the man who 
robbed the store`? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not confident Extremely confident 
at all 
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Appendix C 
Manipulation Check Questions for Experiment 1 
What did Detective Thompson tell Miss Jones when he showed her the photo lineup? 
a) He told her to pick the person who looked most like the culprit 
b) He told her that the culprit may or may not be present among the photos 
c) He told her to pick someone, even if she was not positive 
Which of the following did Detective Thompson say to Miss Jones when she picked number 
four out of the photo lineup? 
a) Detective Thompson gave no reaction and said "Thank you Miss Jones" 
b) Detective Thompson reacted to her statement and said "Great j ob, Miss Jones. 
You picked the guy we thought it was. Thank you Miss Jones." 
What was the store clerk at the mall able to say regarding Mr. Cooper's alibi? 
a) He could not recognize a photo of Mr. Cooper as having been at the mall that 
nlg t. 
b) He recognized Mr. Cooper's photo as having been at the mall that night, but could 
not confirm the time of the evening. 
c) He recognized Mr. Cooper's photo as having been at the mall that night, and said 
that it was approximately 7:30-8:00 PM. 
Is there anything about the procedure used by Detective Thompson in conducting the photo 
lineup that causes you some concern? 
a) No, it appeared to be done objectively 
b) Yes, I was bothered by (fill in a statement below regarding what bothered you) 
Consider again the four questions that Prosecutor Linskey posed to Miss Jones. Which of the 
answers to these questions would be the most important for you to know in determining the 
accuracy of Miss Jones's identification`? Mark 1 for the most important, 2 for the next most 
important, 3 for the next most important, and 4 for the least important. 
 "Miss Jones, at the time that you picked the main from the photo lineup, how certain 
were you that he was the man who robbed the store`?" 
 "Miss Jones, how good of a view did you get of the robber?" 
 "Miss Jones, how much attention were you paying to the robber's face while the 
crime was occurring?" 
 "Miss Jones, how confident are you now that the man you picked from the lineup was 
the man who robbed the store`?" 
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Appendix D 
Crime and Investigation Description for Experiment 2 
Thursday night at about 7:45pm, a man dressed in a black, hooded sweatshirt and 
jeans walked into the 7-11. After walking around for a few minutes and picking up a few 
items, he approached the cashier, a 17-year-old girl named Sarah Jones, and pulled a gun and 
a plastic bag out of the front pocket of his sweatshirt. He told her to open up the register and 
put all the money into his bag. As she opened the register, she noticed that he was not 
wearing any gloves and that one of his hands was on the counter. Approximately $280 was 
placed into the bag. Miss Jones hit the alarm button below the counter while emptying the 
register, but by the time the police showed up, the man had already fled in a small, dark 
green car. 
Miss Jones was taken into the police headquarters and met with Detective Thompson, 
who asked her to give a complete description of the man who had robbed the store. Sarah 
described the culprit as a white man in his late twenties, about 6 feet tall and about 1501bs 
with short dark brown hair. She described his clothing and said that the car was a 
nondescript dark green sedan, and she thought that the license plate started with the number 
9. She was too in shock after the incident to notice anything else about it. 
Detective Thompson told the police officers in his precinct to stop any cars that fit the 
description, had the number 9 anywhere in the license plate sequence, and were being driven 
by a male between the ages of 20 and 3 5 . The police stopped a few vehicles that evening, 
and two of the vehicles were being driven by males who fit the description of the culprit. 
Although neither man had a license plate that started with the number 9, both had license 
plates that had the number 9 somewhere in the sequence. Also, although neither of the 
drivers was wearing a black, hooded sweatshirt and neither had a bag of money with him, the 
police reasoned that the culprit could have changed and stashed the money somewhere. Both 
men, Sam Cooper and Robert Casey, were called in for questioning. 
Robert Casey told the police that he had been out to eat with his girlfriend at the time 
of the crime. He was able to show the police his credit card receipt from ten minutes after 
the crime occurred. The waitress at the restaurant and his girlfriend confirmed that he was at 
the restaurant at the time of the crime, so he was released. 
Sam Cooper, on the other hand, said that he was shopping for a birthday present for 
his mother at the local mall at the time of the crime but had not bought anything. He did not 
have a receipt to prove his whereabouts and could not name anybody to back up his alibi. 
Additionally, while investigating his record, the police found that he had been arrested about 
a year ago for driving under the influence. Since there was no other evidence linking Mr. 
Cooper to the crime, they asked if they could take a picture of him to place in a photo lineup. 
Mr. Cooper agreed and was released after the photo was taken. 
The next day, Detective Thompson asked Miss Jones to come to the headquarters to 
look at a photo lineup. When she arrived he placed six pictures on the table in front of her. 
All of the pictures were of men who fit the general description that Miss Jones had given: 
male, late twenties, about 1 S Olbs with short dark brown hair. The pictures were numbered 
one through six. Sam Cooper was number four. The rest of the pictures were of other men 
who were either incarcerated or were police officers in civilian clothing, so none of the other 
men were suspects in the crime. 
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Detective Thompson asked Miss Jones to look carefully at the pictures and see if she 
recognized the culprit. He told her that the culprit may or may not be present among the 
photos and that she should take her time in studying each face. Miss Jones studied the 
pictures very carefully before indicating number 4, Sam Cooper, as the man who committed 
the crime. Detective Thompson gave no reaction and said, "Thank you, Miss Jones." He 
then walked her to the door and told her that they' d be contacting her again soon. 
Later that evening, Detective Thompson placed a call to Lori Linskey, the prosecuting 
attorney (, and told her, "Miss Jones did a great j ob today. She picked the guy we thought it 
was.") He confirmed with Prosecutor Linskey that she would visit Miss Jones the next day to 
ask her a few questions about the crime so that Prosecutor Linskey could begin to gather 
information about the crime. 
After talking with Prosecutor Linskey, Detective Thompson also called Miss Jones(, 
and told her, "You did a great j ob today. You picked the guy we thought it was.") He (also) 
told her when and where Prosecutor Linskey would be meeting her the next day so that Miss 
Jones would be expecting her visit. 
As promised, Prosecutor Linskey visited Miss Jones during her shift at the 7-11 the 
next day to ask her a few questions. First, she asked Miss Jones to tell her side of the story 
again. When Miss Jones had told her the story up through the lineup, Prosecutor Linskey 
said, "It is very important that we know this. At the time that you picked the man from the 
photo lineup, how certain were you that he was the man who robbed the store`?" (How certain 
aye you that the man you picked from the photo lineup was the man who robbed the store?") 
Miss Jones looked her straight in the eye and said, "I am/was extremely positive. You could 
say that I am/was 120% certain that the man in the photo that I picked is the man who did it. 
There is/was really no doubt in my mind at all." (Miss Jones looked at her and said, "Well, I 
think/thought that it was him, but I really can't/couldn't be positive. I guess I 
think/remember thinking that it might be him.") Prosecutor Linskey wrote down Miss Jones' 
responses in her notebook, thanked her and returned to her office. 
Upon returning to her office, Prosecutor Linskey called Detective Thompson to find 
out if the police had uncovered any more evidence or followed up on Mr. Cooper's alibi. He 
told her that further investigation of Mr. Cooper's alibi revealed that a clerk at the local mall 
said he recognized Mr. Cooper's photo as a person who had been in the mall that evening. 
He could not, however, confirm the time of the evening that he thought he saw Mr. Cooper. 
Additionally, Miss Jones had stated that the robber touched the counter surface. No 
fingerprints lifted from the counter matched Mr. Cooper's prints, but there were several 
smudged prints that could not be identified. 
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Appendix E 
Dependent Measures for Experiment 2 
How likely do you think it is that Miss Jones made an accurate identification of Mr. Cooper? 
1 2 3 4 S 6 7 8 9 10 
Not likely at all Extremely likely 
How good of a view do you think Miss Jones had of the robber? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Horrible view Perfect view 
How much attention do you think Miss Jones was paying to the robber's face while the crime 
was occurring? 
1 2 3 4 S 6 7 8 9 10 
Not paying Paying very close 
attention attention 
To what extent is the mall clerk's statement significant in backing up Mr. Cooper's alibi? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not significant Very significant 
To what extent do you think that Miss Jones' statement of her certainty in the identification 
accurately reflects how certain she was in her identification at the time that she picked the 
man from the lineup? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Definitely not 
To what extent does the failure to find Mr. Cooper's fingerprints on the counter raise concern 
that Cooper might not be the robber? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
No concern Maximum concern 
Do you think that Mr. Cooper should be charged with robbing the 7-11 store? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Definitely should Definitely should 
Not be charged be charged 
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Appendix F 
Manipulation Check Questions for Experiment 2 
What did Detective Thompson tell Miss Jones when he showed her the photo lineup? 
a) He told her to pick the person who looked most like the culprit 
b) He told her that the culprit may or may not be present among the photos 
c) He told her to pick someone, even if she was not positive 
Which of the following did Detective Thompson say to Prosecutor Linskey when he called 
her? (Please be sure to read all of the options before answering) 
a) He told her, "Miss Jones did a great j ob today. She picked the guy we thought it 
was." He also confirmed when and where she would be meeting Miss Jones the next 
day. 
b) He told her that Mr. Cooper's alibi could not be definitively confirmed. He also 
confirmed when and where she would be meeting Miss Jones the next day. 
c) He confirmed when and where she would be meeting Miss Jones the next day. 
Which of the following did Detective Thompson say to Miss Jones when he called her after 
talking with Prosecutor Linskey? (Please be sure to read all of the options before answering) 
a) He told her when and where Prosecutor Linskey would be meeting her the next 
day. 
b) He said "You did a great job today. You picked the guy we thought it was." He 
also told her when and where Prosecutor Linskey would be meeting her the next day. 
c) He told her that Mr. Cooper's alibi could not be definitively confirmed. He also 
told her when and where Prosecutor Linskey would be meeting her the next day. 
Which of the following questions did Prosecutor Linskey ask Miss Jones? 
a) Before you saw the photo lineup, how certain were you that you would be able to 
identify the culprit upon seeing him? 
b) How certain are you that the man you picked from the photo lineup was the man 
who robbed the store? 
c) At the time that you picked the man from the photo lineup, how certain were you 
that he was the man who robbed the store? 
d) At trial, how certain do you think you' 11 be that the man you picked from the photo 
lineup was the man who robbed the store? 
What was the store clerk at the mall able to say regarding Mr. Cooper's alibi? 
a) He could not recognize a photo of Mr. Cooper as having been at the mall that 
nig t. 
b) He recognized Mr. Cooper's photo as having been at the mall that night, but could 
not confirm the time of the evening. 
c) He recognized Mr. Cooper's photo as having been at the mall that night, and said 
that it was approximately 7:30-8:00 PM. 
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Is there anything about how Detective Thompson interacted with the witness that causes you 
some concern? 
a) No, everything appeared to be fine to me 
b) Yes, I was bothered by (fill in a statement below regarding what bothered you) 
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Table 1 
Eyewitness 'choices f~on~ lineup as functions of the vandal 's presence o~ absence and 
biasing instructions, and students' predictions (in %) 
Choice of vandal Choice of innocent No choice 
person 
Vandal present 
Biased instructions 
Unbiased instructions 
Vandal absent 
Biased instructions 
Unbiased instructions 
75 (79) 
83 (74) 
25 (12) 0 (10) 
0 (15) 17 (12) 
78 (16) 22 (84) 
33 (18) 67 (81) 
Note: Students' predictions are in parentheses. Dashes indicate that the situation cannot 
occur. 
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Table 2 
Participants' predictions of how the eyewitness would have answered questions about the 
witnessed event and the subsequent identification as a function of either finding out that the 
eyewitness received feedback or not. 
No Feedback 
(n = 48) 
Feedback 
(n = 48) 
Retrospective Confidence M 7.38 6.79 
SD 1.73 1.58 
CI (6.89, 7.87) (6.34, 7.24) 
View M 6.85 6.50 
SD 1.92 1.85 
CI (6.31, 7.39) (5.98, 7.02) 
Attention M 5.3 5 5.04 
SD 2.04 1.64 
CI (4.77, 5.93) (4.58, 5.50) 
Current Confidence M 6.55 6.33 
SD 2.32 2.35 
CI (5.89, 7.21) (5.67, 6.99) 
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Table 3 
Participants' ratings of how important they thought each question was to determine the 
accuracy of the eyewitness's identification, with 1 being the most important and 4 being the 
least iTnportant, as a function of either finding out that the eyewitness received feedback or 
not. 
No Feedback Feedback 
(n = 48) (n = 48) 
Retrospective Confidence M 2.79 2.65 
SD 0.97 1.02 
CI (2.53, 3.05) (2.36, 2.94) 
View M 2.19 2.17 
SD 0.98 1.02 
CI (1.91, 2.47) (1.88, 2.46) 
Attention M 1.92 1.94 
SD 0.94 0.81 
CI (1.65, 2.19) (1.71, 2.17) 
Current Confidence M 3.29 3.25 
SD 1.51 1.16 
CI (2.86, 3.72) (2.92, 3.58) 
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Table 4 
Correlation matrix for all participants' predictions of the eyewitness's ratings of 
retrospective confidence, view, attention, and current confidence. 
Retrospective View 
Confidence 
Confidence 
Attention Current 
Retrospective Confidence 1 
View .542** 1 
CI (.39, .67) 
Attention .386** .655** 1 
CI (.21, .55) (.53, .77) 
Current Confidence .278* .452** .468** 1 
CI (.08, .46) (.29, .60) (.31, .62) 
Note: *Correlation is significant at the .0061evel, ** Correlation is significant at <.001 level 
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Table 5 
Correlation matrix for the paYticipants' predictions of the eyewitness's ratings of 
retrospective confidence, view, attention, and current confidence, separated by feedback 
condition. 
Retrospective View Attention Current 
Confidence 
Confidence 
No Feedback Condition 
Retrospective Confidence 1 
View .667*** 1 
CI (.47, .80) 
Attention .486*** .708*** 1 
CI (24, .68) (.53, .83) 
Current Confidence .550*** .667*** .578*** 1 
CI (.32, .73) (.47, .80) (.36, .75) 
Feedback Condition 
Retrospective Confidence 1 
View .386** 
Attention 
Current Confidence 
1 
.585*** 1 
(.37, .75) 
.231 .340* 1 
Note: *Correlation is significant at < .OS level, **Correlation is significant at < .Ol level, 
*** Correlation is significant at <.001 level 
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Table 6 
Participants' predictions of how the eyewitness would have answered questions about the 
witnessed event and the subsequent identification as a function of either being concerned 
about the presence of feedback or not being aware that feedback occurred. 
Concern About 
No Feedback Feedback 
(n = 48) (n = 22) 
Retrospective Confidence M 7.38 6.50 
SD 1.73 1.50 
CI (6.89, 7.87) (5.87, 7.13) 
View M 6.85 6.27 
SD 1.92 1.88 
CI (6.31, 7.39) (5.48, 7.06) 
Attention M 5.3 5 4.95 
SD 2.04 1.76 
CI (4.77, 5.93) (4.22, 5.69) 
Current Confidence M 6.55 7.05 
SD 2.32 2.38 
CI (5.89, 7.21) (6.06, 8.04) 
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Table 7 
Participants' ratings of how important they thought each question ws to determine the 
accuracy of the eyewitness's identification, with 1 being the most important and 4 being the 
least important as a function of either being concerned about the presence of feedback or not 
being aware that feedback occurred. 
No Feedback 
(n = 48) 
Concern About 
Feedback 
(n = 22) 
Retrospective Confidence M 2.79 2.45 
SD 0.97 1.01 
CI (2.53, 3.05) (2.03, 2.87) 
View M 2.19 2.50 
SD 0.98 0.91 
CI (1.91, 2.47) (2.12, 2.88) 
Attention M 1.92 1.90 
SD 0.94 0.97 
CI (1.65, 2.19) (1.49, 2.31) 
Current Confidence M 3.29 3.14 
SD 1.51 1.28 
CI (2.86, 3.72) (2.61, 3.67) 
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Table 8 
PaNticipants' ratings on a scale fNOTn Knot likely at all) to 10(extremely likely) of how likely 
they thought it was that the eyewitness made an accurate identification of the suspect. 
No Feedback Feedback 
Retrospective Confidence 
Low M 5.36 5.02 
SD 1.66 1.78 
CI (4.86, 5.86) (4.51, 5.53) 
n 42 46 
High M 5.84 5.55 
SD 1.93 1.78 
CI (5.28, 6.40) (5.01, 6.09) 
n 45 42 
CuNrent Confidence 
Low M 5.04 4.91 
SD 1.65 1.61 
CI (4.56, 5.52) (4.44, 5.38) 
n 46 45 
High M 5.64 5.61 
SD 2.27 1.98 
CI (4.99, 6.29) (5.04, 6.18) 
n 47 46 
57 
Table 9 
Participants' ratings on a scale from 1(definitely should not be charged) to 10(definitely 
should be charged) of whether they thought that the suspect should be charged with the 
crime. 
No Feedback Feedback 
RetYospective Confidence 
Low M 3.67 3.39 
SD 2.26 1.90 
CI (2.99, 4.35) (2.84, 3.94) 
n 42 46 
High M 4.56 4.19 
SD 2.15 2.11 
CI (3.93, 5.19) (3.55, 4.83)) 
n 45 42 
Current Confidence 
Low M 3.50 3.12 
SD 2.02 1.50 
CI (2.92, 4.08) (2.68, 3.56) 
n 46 45 
High M 4.32 4.26 
SD 2.18 228 
CI (3.70, 4.94) (3.60, 4.92) 
n 47 46 
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Table 10 
Ratings on a scale from Knot likely at all) to 10(extremely likely) of how likely the 
participants who expressed concern about feedback (n=79) thought it was that the 
eyewitness made an accurate identification of the suspect. 
Low Confidence High Confidence 
Retrospective Confidence M 4.85 5.38 
SD 1.84 1.45 
CI (4.04, 5.66) (4.59, 6.17) 
n 20 13 
Current Confidence M 4.40 5.23 
SD 1.57 1.80 
CI (3.71, 5.09) (4.54, 5.92) 
n 20 26 
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Table 11 
Ratings on a scale frofn 1(definitely should not be charged) to 10(definitely should be 
chaNged) of whetheY the participants who expressed concern about the presence of feedback 
(n=79) thought that the suspect should be charged with the crime. 
Low Confidence High Confidence 
Retrospective Confidence M 3.15 4.31 
SD 1.76 2.10 
CI (2.38, 3.92) (3.17, 5.45) 
n 20 13 
Current Confidence M 2.60 4.23 
SD 0.99 1.99 
CI (2.17, 3.03) (3.47, 4.99) 
n 20 26 
